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General Assembly
Security Council

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28 November 2001

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General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 166
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 27 November 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to draw your attention to the latest act of Palestinian terrorism directed against Israel.

This morning, at approximately 11.30 a.m. (local time), Palestinian terrorists disembarked from a stolen Israeli vehicle in the centre of the northern Israeli city of Afula and opened fire indiscriminately with automatic weapons near a market crowded with pedestrians. Two Israelis — Michal Mor, age 25, and Noam Gozovsky, age 23 — were killed in the hail of automatic gunfire, and more than 50 others were injured, 10 of them seriously.

Today's attack represents the latest incident in the continuing campaign of Palestinian terrorism directed against Israeli civilians. Previous attacks have been detailed in my letters dated 12 November 2001 (A/56/617-S/2001/1071), 5 November 2001 (A/56/604-S/2001/1048), 24 October 2001 (A/56/506-S/2001/1011), 19 October 2001 (A/56/492-S/2001/990), 17 October 2001 (A/56/483-S/2001/975), 8 October 2001 (A/56/450-S/2001/948), 5 October 2001 (A/56/444-S/2001/943), 3 October 2001 (A/56/438-S/2001/938), 24 September 2001 (A/56/406-S/2001/907), 20 September 2001 (A/56/386-S/2001/892), 17 September 2001 (A/56/367-S/2001/875), 7 September 2001 (A/56/346-S/2001/858), 4 September 2001 (A/56/331-S/2001/840), 30 August 2001 (A/56/325-S/2001/834), 27 August 2001 (A/56/324-S/2001/825), 13 August 2001 (A/56/294-S/2001/787), 9 August 2001 (A/56/286-S/2001/780), 8 August 2001 (A/56/280-S/2001/775), 6 August 2001 (A/56/272-S/2001/768), 27 July 2001 (A/56/225-S/2001/743), 26 July 2001 (A/56/223-S/2001/737), 17 July 2001 (A/56/201-S/2001/706), 13 July 2001 (A/56/184-S/2001/696), 3 July 2001 (A/56/138-S/2001/662), 2 July 2001 (A/56/131-S/2001/656), 21 June 2001 (A/56/119-S/2001/619), 19 June 2001 (A/56/98-S/2001/611), 18 June 2001 (A/56/97-S/2001/604), 13 June 2001 (A/56/92-S/2001/585), 11 June 2001 (A/56/91-S/2001/580), 4 June 2001 (A/56/85-S/2001/555), 30 May 2001 (A/56/81-S/2001/540), 25 May 2001 (A/56/80-S/2001/524), 18 May 2001 (A/56/78-S/2001/506), 11 May 2001 (A/56/72-S/2001/473), 9 May 2001 (A/56/69-S/2001/459), 1 May 2001 (A/55/924-

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S/2001/435), 23 April 2001 (A/55/910-S/2001/396), 16 April 2001 (A/55/901-S/2001/364), 28 March 2001 (A/55/863-S/2001/291), 27 March 2001 (A/55/860-S/2001/280), 26 March 2001 (A/55/858-S/2001/278), 19 March 2001 (A/55/842-S/2001/244), 5 March 2001 (A/55/821-S/2001/193), 2 March 2001 (A/55/819-S/2001/187), 14 February 2001 (A/55/787-S/2001/137), 13 February 2001 (A/55/781-S/2001/132), 2 February 2001 (A/55/762-S/2001/103), 25 January 2001 (A/55/748-S/2001/81), 23 January 2001 (A/55/742-S/2001/71), 28 December 2000 (A/55/719-S/2000/1252), 22 November 2000 (A/55/641-S/2000/1114), 20 November 2000 (A/55/634-S/2000/1108) and 2 November 2000 (A/55/540-S/2000/1065).

In a statement faxed to the Reuters news agency, both Islamic Jihad and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claimed responsibility for the attack. It should be noted that Islamic Jihad has its headquarters in Damascus and receives financial assistance from Iran and logistic assistance from Syria, while the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade is closely associated with Palestinian Authority Chairman Yassir Arafat's own Fatah faction. The statement's reference to a "joint operation" and a "unified struggle" underscores the depth of cooperation between forces tied to the Palestinian Authority and other violent terrorist organizations.

Moreover, this attack comes on the same day as renewed efforts got under way to achieve a ceasefire between the sides and as Israeli troops completed their redeployments from Palestinian areas. Efforts to restore calm to the region will be doomed at the outset so long as the Palestinian leadership continues to avoid taking the action necessary to control terror.

Such a situation is particularly intolerable at a time when the world is uniting to combat the common threat of terrorism. The key to the success of this campaign will be the exertion of maximum international pressure on all States and entities that support terrorism, or are actively engaged in terrorist operations, to ensure their compliance with international law.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter circulated as an official document of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 166, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yehuda **Lancry**
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2001/1122

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 November 2001

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus

(For the period from 30 May to 27 November 2001)

I. Introduction

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 30 May to 27 November 2001 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions, most recently resolution 1354 (2001) of 15 June 2001.

II. Activities of the Force

A. Maintenance of the ceasefire and the military status quo

2. The situation along the ceasefire lines remained calm. There were fewer incidents, particularly in the area of Nicosia, where the opposing forces are in close proximity. These incidents included cocking and pointing of weapons at UNFICYP soldiers, temporary moves forward into the unmanned positions, stone-throwing and verbal abuse. Restrictions imposed on UNFICYP in July and November 2000 by the Turkish Forces/Turkish Cypriot security forces continued, including the violation of the military status quo in the village of Strovilia.

3. There were 34 air violations: 11 by National Guard aircraft, 12 by Turkish military aircraft, 4 by Greek Cypriot civilian aircraft, 2 by civilian aircraft from the north, 1 Cyprus police helicopter and 4 of unknown origin.

4. Crossings of the maritime security lines — the seaward extensions of the median line of the buffer zone that vessels of either side are advised, for their own safety, not to cross — continued. There were around 250 crossings by Turkish forces of the western line, all associated with re-supply runs to the Kokkina pocket. In the east, near Famagusta, there were almost 3,000 crossings of the maritime security line from the south, including by fishing boats and pleasure craft. Incursions in the buffer zone, mainly by Greek Cypriot hunters, increased significantly in November at the beginning of the winter hunting season. This led to a number of incidents, with some hunters discharging their weapons in the proximity of UNFICYP personnel.

5. In connection with restrictions on UNFICYP by the Turkish Forces/Turkish Cypriot security forces, patrols by UNFICYP to the fenced-off areas of Varosha were prohibited. The patrols were resumed in September 2001 but are now escorted by the Turkish Cypriot security forces. The Turkish Forces persisted in hoisting flags on one of the buildings, in violation of the military status quo. The United Nations holds the Government of Turkey responsible for the maintenance of the status quo in Varosha.

6. The National Guard continued to develop and strengthen two defensive positions which were started in December 2000 just outside the United Nations buffer zone south of Pyla. The National Guard stated that this construction was linked to, and in compensation for, their de-mining programme, which

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was nearing completion in one of the minefields linking the two positions. The Turkish forces, in turn, reinforced their observation post adjacent to Pyla by adding some sandbags.

B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions

7. The number of meetings between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots decreased during the reporting period. Numerous planned events could not go ahead because the Turkish Cypriot authorities did not allow Turkish Cypriots to participate. In July, a planned concert by a bicommunal choir in the buffer zone village of Pyla had to be moved to another location because the Turkish Cypriots raised security concerns. The concert went ahead in the buffer zone with the participation of Greek Cypriot choir members only. UNFICYP also assisted in facilitating monthly meetings of political party representatives from both sides, media gatherings, music rehearsals and a business dialogue forum at Ledra Palace. The largest bicommunal gathering was the commemoration of United Nations Day on 21 October, at Ledra Palace in the buffer zone. Around 7,300 Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots attended, turning this into the biggest bicommunal event recorded by UNFICYP.

8. UNFICYP continued to carry out its mandated humanitarian tasks in support of the 427 Greek Cypriots and 165 Maronites living in the northern part of the island, and those Turkish Cypriots in the southern part who have made themselves known to the Force. UNFICYP also facilitated the rotation of teachers at the Greek Cypriot elementary school in Rizokarpaso in the Karpas peninsula.

9. UNFICYP visited Mr. Omer Gazi Tekogul, a Turkish Cypriot sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment for heroin possession, and facilitated visits by his family, friends and doctors. Mr. Tekogul was pardoned and released on 28 September.

10. UNFICYP continued to support civilian activities in the buffer zone. These included farming, liaising with local representatives to solve water supply problems, coordinating maintenance work on utilities, the extension of the Klimos river wall in Sector 2 to prevent flooding, and construction of a 73-bed hospital facility in Paralimni in Sector 4, part of which will be in the buffer zone. UNFICYP also designated a piece of land in the buffer zone west of Nicosia for civilian use, mainly for housing. In Pyla, UNFICYP brokered an agreement between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot village leaders on road safety measures.

C. Missing persons

11. The First Assistant to the Third Member of the Committee on Missing Persons continued to work with the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members to overcome existing obstacles and enable the Committee to resume its activities. The Government of Cyprus continued to implement its unilateral programme of exhumation and identification of the remains of persons. During the period under review, both leaders addressed letters to me concerning specific proposals for the work of the Committee.

III. Mission of good offices

12. In June, I reported to the Council that it had not proved possible to resume the talks that had been interrupted since November 2000 (see S/2001/534). Efforts to this end continued in the second half of 2001. I met Mr. Rauf Denktash at Salzburg, Austria, on 28 August. My Special Adviser on Cyprus, Mr. Alvaro de Soto, was in Cyprus during the period from 29 August to 5 September. On 4 September, he conveyed to Mr. Glafcos Clerides and to Mr. Denktash my invitation to resume the search for a comprehensive settlement by engaging in a new and reinvigorated phase of my good offices, beginning with separate meetings with the two leaders in New York on 12 September. This was accepted by Mr. Clerides but declined by Mr. Denktash. On 26 September, members of the Security Council encouraged me to continue my efforts using the guidelines set forth in Council resolution 1250 (1999) of 29 June 1999. Mr. de Soto travelled to Cyprus, Turkey and Greece in early November. Mr. Denktash wrote directly to Mr. Clerides on 8 November, proposing a face-to-face meeting on the island, without preconditions. I met Mr. Clerides in New York on 9 November. After an exchange of letters, the leaders have agreed to meet in the United Nations Protected Area on 4 December. Mr. de Soto will be present.

IV. Organizational matters

13. As at November 2001, UNFICYP comprised 1,227 troops, 35 civilian police and 139 civilian personnel. The military personnel were from Argentina (404), Austria (8), Canada (2), Finland (3), Hungary (121), Slovakia (273), Ireland (5) and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (411). The Argentinean contingent included soldiers from Bolivia (2), Brazil (2), Chile (1), Paraguay (1) and Uruguay (3). The civilian police are provided by Australia (15) and Ireland (20). Of the 139 civilian staff, 39 were recruited internationally and 100 locally.

14. Mr. de Soto continued as my Special Adviser on Cyprus, Mr. Zbigniew Wlosowicz as Acting Special Representative and Chief of Mission, and Major General Victory Rana as Force Commander.

V. Financial aspects

15. The General Assembly, by its resolution 55/266 of 14 June 2001, appropriated the amount of $42,389,220 gross for the maintenance of UNFICYP for the 12-month period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002. This amount includes the pledged voluntary contribution of one third of the cost of the Force, equivalent to $13,565,715, from the Government of Cyprus and the annual pledge of $6.5 million from the Government of Greece.

16. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months as recommended in paragraph 19 below, the costs of maintaining the Force would be limited to the amount indicated above.

17. As at 31 October 2001, unpaid assessments to the Special Account for UNFICYP for the period from 16 June 1993 to 15 December 2001 amounted to $21.9 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to [illegible] illion.

VI. Observations

18. During the past six months, the situation along the ceasefire lines has been calm. Regrettably, no progress was made in removing the restrictions imposed by the Turkish Cypriot authorities and Turkish forces on UNFICYP or in restoring the status quo ante at Strovilia.

19. Under the present circumstances, I consider the peacekeeping operation in Cyprus essential for the maintenance of the ceasefire on the island. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months, until 15 June 2002.

20. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to Mr. Alvaro de Soto, my Special Adviser, to Mr. Zbigniew Wlosowicz, the Acting Special Representative and Chief of Mission, to Major General Victory Rana, the Force Commander, and to the men and women serving with UNFICYP for the professionalism and dedication with which they have carried out their duties.

United Nations S/2001/1122*

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

Map No. 2930 Rev. 50 UNITED NATIONS
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Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2001/1123

Security Council

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29 November 2001

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Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including its resolutions 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, 1352 (2001) of 1 June 2001 and 1360 (2001) of 3 July 2001, as they relate to the improvement of the humanitarian programme for Iraq,

Convinced of the need as a temporary measure to continue to provide for the civilian needs of the Iraqi people until the fulfilment by the Government of Iraq of the relevant resolutions, including notably resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 and 1284 (1999), allows the Council to take further action with regard to the prohibitions referred to in resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990 in accordance with the provisions of these resolutions,

Determined to improve the humanitarian situation in Iraq,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* that the provisions of resolution 986 (1995), except those contained in paragraphs 4, 11 and 12 and subject to paragraph 15 of resolution 1284 (1999), and the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 to 13 of resolution 1360 (2001) shall remain in force for a new period of 180 days beginning at 0001 hours, Eastern Standard Time, on 1 December 2001;

2. *Notes* the proposed Goods Review List (as contained in Annex 1 to this resolution) and the procedures for its application (as contained in Annex 2 to this resolution) and decides that it will adopt the List and the procedures, subject to any refinements to them agreed by the Council in light of further consultations, for implementation beginning on 30 May 2002;

3. *Reaffirms* the obligation of all States, pursuant to resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions, to prevent the sale or supply to Iraq of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other military equipment, and to prevent the making available to Iraq of any funds or any other financial or economic resources, except as authorized by existing resolutions;

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4. *Stresses* the obligation of Iraq to cooperate with the implementation of this resolution and other applicable resolutions, including by respecting the security and safety of all persons directly involved in their implementation;

5. *Appeals* to all States to continue to cooperate in the timely submission of technically complete applications and the expeditious issuing of export licences, and to take all other appropriate measures within their competence in order to ensure that urgently needed humanitarian supplies reach the Iraqi population as rapidly as possible;

6. *Reaffirms* its commitment to a comprehensive settlement on the basis of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, including any clarification necessary for the implementation of resolution 1284 (1999);

7. *Decides* that, for the purposes of this resolution, references in resolution 1360 (2001) to the 150-day period established by that resolution shall be interpreted to refer to the 180-day period established pursuant to paragraph 1 above;

8. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex 1

06/29/01

Proposed Goods Review List (GRL)

(Note: Arms and munitions are prohibited under UNSCR 687, para. 24 and thus are not included on the review list.)

A. Items subject to the provisions of UNSCR 1051 (1996).

B. The List contained in document S/2001/1120, annex (to the extent, if any, the items on these lists are not covered by UNSCR 687, para. 24). The list includes the following general categories and includes clarifying notes and statements of understanding: (1) advanced materials; (2) materials processing; (3) electronics; (4) computers; (5) telecommunications and information security; (6) sensors and lasers; (7) navigation and avionics; (8) marine; and (9) propulsion.

C. The following individual items, as further described in the annex:

Command, Control, Communication and Simulation

1. Specific advanced telecommunications equipment.

2. Information security equipment.

Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Night Vision

3. Specialized electronic instrumentation and test equipment.

4. Image intensifier night vision systems, tubes, and components.

Aircraft and Related Items

5. Specialized radar equipment.

6. Non-civil certified aircraft; all aero gas turbine engines; unmanned aerial vehicles; and parts and components.

7. Non-xray explosive detection equipment

Naval-related Items

8. Air independent propulsion (AIP) engines and fuel cells specially designed for underwater vehicles, and specially designed components therefor.

9. Marine acoustic equipment.

Explosives

10. Charges and devices specially designed for civil projects, and containing small quantities of energetic materials.

Missile-Related Items

11. Specialized vibration test equipment.

Conventional Weapons Manufacturing

12. Specialized semiconductor manufacturing equipment.

Heavy Military Transport

13. Low-bed trailers/loaders with a carrying capacity greater than 30 metric tonnes and width equal to or greater than 3 meters.

Biological Weapons Equipment

14. Certain Biological Equipment.

06/29/01

Annex to Proposed Goods Review List (GRL)

Technical Parameters for Individual Items

#1. Specific advanced telecommunication equipment

a. Any type of telecommunications equipment, specially designed to operate outside the temperature range from 218 K (-55° C) to 397 K (124° C);

b. Phased array antennae, containing active elements and distributed components, and designed to permit electronic control of beam shaping and pointing, except for landing systems with instruments meeting International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards (microwave landing systems (MLS));

c. Radio relay communications equipment designed for use at frequencies of 7.9 through 10.55 GHz or exceeding 40 GHz and assemblies and components therefor;

d. Optical fiber cables of more than 5 meters in length, and preforms or drawn fibers of glass or other materials optimized for manufacture and use as optical telecommunications transmission medium. Optical terminals and optical amplifiers;

e. Software specially designed for the development or production of the components or equipment in a-d above;

f. Technology for the development, design or production of the components, software, or equipment in a-d above.

#2. Information security equipment

Information security equipment having any of the following characteristics:

a. a symmetric encryption algorithm;

b. an asymmetric encryption algorithm;

c. a discrete-log encryption algorithm;

d. analog encryption or scrambling;

e. TCSEC Bl, B2, B3, or Al or equivalent Multilevel Secure (MLS) computer systems;

f. Software specially designed for the development or production of a-a above;

g. Technology for the development, design or production of a-a above.

Note 1: This entry does not require review of items that meet all of the following:

a. Generally available to the public, by being sold, without restriction, from stock at retail selling points by means of any of the following:

a.1. Over the counter transactions;

a.2. Mail order transactions;

a.3. Electronic transactions;

a.4. Telephone call transactions;

b. The cryptographic functionality cannot easily be changed by the user;

c. Designed for installation by the user without further substantial support by the supplier; and

d. When necessary, details of the items are accessible and will be provided, upon request, to the appropriate authority in the exporter's country in order to ascertain compliance with conditions described in paragraphs a-c above.

Note 2: This item does not require review of:

a. Personalized smart cards where the cryptographic capability is restricted for use in equipment or systems excluded from control under entries b-f of this note. If a personalized smart card has multiple functions, the control status of each function is addressed individually;

b. Receiving equipment for radio broadcast, pay television, or similar restricted audience broadcast of the consumer type, without digital encryption except that exclusively used for sending the billing or program-related information back to the broadcast providers;

c. Equipment where the cryptographic capability is not user-accessible and which is specially designed and limited to allow any of the following:

c.1. Execution of copy-protected software;

c.2. Access to any of the following:

c.2.a. Copy-protected contents stored on read-only media; or

c.2.b. Information stored in encrypted form on media (e.g. in connection with intellectual property rights) where the media is offered for sale in identical sets to the public; or

c.2.c. One-time copying of copyright-protected audio/video data.

d. Cryptographic equipment specially designed and limited for banking use or money transactions;

Technical Note: "Money transactions" includes the collection and settlement of fares or credit functions.

e. Portable or mobile radiotelephones for civil use (e.g. for commercial civil cellular radiocommunications systems) that are not capable of end-to-end encryption;

f. Cordless telephone equipment not capable of end-to-end encryption where the maximum effective range of unboosted cordless operation (i.e., a single, unrelayed hop between terminal and home basestation) is less than 400 meters according to the manufacturer's specifications.

#3. Specialized electronic instrumentation and test equipment

a. Signal analysers from 4 through 31 GHz;

b. Microwave test receivers from 4 through 40 GHz;

c. Network analysers from 4 through 40 GHz;

d. Signal generators from 4 through 31 GHz;

e. Travelling wave tubes, pulsed or continuous wave, as follows:

e.1. Coupled cavity tubes, or derivatives thereof;

e.2. Helix tubes, or derivatives thereof, with any of the following:

e.2.a.i. An instantaneous bandwidth of half an octave or more; and e.2.a.2. The product of the rated average output power (expressed in kW) and the maximum operating frequency (expressed in GHz) of more than 0.2;

e.2.b.1 An instantaneous bandwidth of less than half an octave; and e.2.b.2. The product of the rated average output power (expressed in kW) and the maximum operating frequency (expressed in GHz) of more than 0.4;

f. Equipment specially designed for the manufacture of electron tubes, optical elements and specially designed components therefor;

g. Hydrogen/hydrogen-isotope thyratrons of ceramic-metal construction and rate for a peak current of 500 A or more;

h. Digital instrumentation data recorders having any of the following characteristics:

h.1. A maximum digital interface transfer rate exceeding 175 Mbit/s; or

h.2. Space qualified.

i. Radiation and radioisotope detection and simulation equipment, analysers, software, and Nuclear Instrumentation Module (NIM) componentry and mainframes;

j. Software specially designed for the development or production of the components or equipment in a-i above;

k. Technology for the development, design or production of the components or equipment in a-i above.

Note: Items a-e do not require review when contained in contracts for civil telecommunications projects, including ongoing maintenance, operation, and repair of the system, certified for civil use by the supplier government.

#4. Image intensifier night vision systems, tubes, and components

a. Night vision systems (i.e., cameras or direct view imaging equipment) using an image intensifier tube that utilizes a microchannel plate (MCP) and an S-20, S-25, GaAs, or GaInAs photocathode.

b. Image intensifier tubes that utilize a microchannel plate (MCP) and an S-20, S-25, GaAs, or GsINAs photocathode with a sensitivity of 240 micro Amps per lumen and below:

c. Microchannel plates of 15 micrometers and above.

d. Software specially designed for the development or production of the components or equipment in a-c above;

e. Technology for the developmen', design or production of the components or equipment in a-c above.

#5. Specialized radar equipment

a. All airborne radar equipment and specially designed components therefor, not including radars specially designed for meteorological use or Mode 3, Mode C, and Mode S civilian air traffic control equipment specially designed to operate only in the 960-1215 MHz band;

Note: This entry does not require initial review of airborne radar equipment installed as original equipment in civil-certified aircraft operating in Iraq.

b. All ground-based primary radar systems that are capable of aircraft detection and tracking.

c. Software specially designed for the development or production of the components or equipment in a and b above;

d. Technology for the development, design or production of the components or equipment in a and b above.

#6. Non-civil certified aircraft; all aero gas turbine engines; unmanned aerial vehicles; and parts and components

a. Non-civil certified aircraft and specially designed parts and components therefor. This does not include parts and components solely designed to accommodate a carrying of passengers including seats, food services, environmental conditioning, lighting systems, and passenger safety devices.

Note: Civil certified aircraft consist of aircraft that have been certified for general civil use by the civil aviation authorities of the original equipment manufacturer's government.

b. All gas turbine engines except those designed for stationary power generation applications, and specially designed parts and components therefor.

c. Unmanned aerial vehicles and parts and components therefor with any of the following characteristics:

c.1. Capable of autonomous operation;

c.2. Capable of operating beyond line of sight;

c.3. Incorporating a satellite navigation receiver (i.e. GPS);

c.4. A gross take-off weight greater than 25 kg (55 pounds).

d. Parts and components for civil-certified aircraft (not including engines).

Note 1: This does not include parts and components for normal maintenance of non-Iraqi owned or leased civil-certified aircraft that were originally qualified or certified by the original equipment manufacturer for that aircraft.

Note 2: For Iraqi-owned or leased civil aircraft, review of parts and components for normal maintenance is not required if the maintenance is performed in a country other than Iraq.

Note 3: For Iraqi-owned or leased aircraft, parts and components are subject to review except for equivalent one-for-one replacement of parts and components that have been certified or qualified by the original equipment manufacturer for use on that aircraft.

Note 4: Any specially designed parts or components that improve the performance of the aircraft remain subject to review. e. Technology, including software, for the design, development and production of equipment and parts/components for the items in sub-items a-d above.

#9. Marine acoustic equipment

a. Marine acoustic systems, equipment and specially designed components therefor, as follows:

a.l. Active (transmitting or transmitting-and-receiving) systems, equipment and specially designed components therefor, as follows:

a.l.a. Wide-swath bathymetric survey systems designed for sea bed topographic mapping designed to measure depths less than 600 m below the water surface

a.2. Passive (receiving, whether or not related in normal application to separate active equipment) systems, equipment and specially designed components thereof as follows:

a.2.a. Hydrophones with sensitivity better than minus 220 Db at any depth with no acceleration' compensation;

a.2.b. Towed acoustic hydrophone arrays designed or able to be modified to operate at depths exceeding 15 meters but not exceeding 35 meters.

a.2.b.1. Heading sensors with an accuracy better than +/- 0.5 degrees.

a.2.c. Processing equipment specially designed for towed acoustic hydrophone arrays.

a.2.d. Processing equipment, specially designed for bottom or bay cable systems.

b. Correlation-velocity sonar log equipment designed to measure the horizontal speed of the equipment carrier relative to the seabed.

Technical Note: Hydrophone sensitivity is defined as twenty times the logarithm to the base 10 of the ratio of rms output voltage to a 1 V rms reference, when the hydrophone sensor, without a pre-amplifier, is placed in a plane wave acoustic field with an rms pressure of 1 p2a. For example, a hydrophone of -160 Db, reference 1 V per uPa) -180 Db.

#10. Charges and devices specially designed for civil projects, and containing small quantities of the following energetic materials:

1. Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine (CAS 2691-41-0) (HMX); octahydro-1,3,5,7-tetranitro-1,3,5,7-tetrazine; 1,3,5,7-tetranitro-1,3,5,7-tetraza-cyclooctane; (octogen, octogene);
2. Hexanitrostilbene (HNS) (CAS 20062-22-0);
3. Triaminotrinitrobenzene (TATB) (CAS 3058-38-6);
4. Triaminoguanidinenitrate (TAGN) (CAS 4000-16-2);
5. Dinitroglycoluril (DNGU, DINGU) (CPS 55510-04-81: tetranitroglycoluril (TNGU, SORGUYL) (CAS 55510-03-7);

6. Tetranitrobenzotriazolobenzotriazole (TACOT) (CAS 25243-36-1);

7. Diaminohexanitrobiphenyl (DIPAM) (CAS 17215-44-0) ;

8. Picrylaminodinitropyridine (PYX) (CAS 38082-89-2);

9. 3-vitro-1,2,4-triazol-5-one (NTO or ONTA) (CAS 932-64-9);

10. Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (RDX) (CAS 121-82-4); cyclonite; T4; hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitro-1, 3, 5-triazine; 1, 3, 5-trinitro-1, 3, 5-triaza-cyclohexane (hexogen, hexogene);

11. 2-(5-cyanotetrazolato) penta amine-cobalt (III) -perchlorate (or CP) (CAS 70247-32-4);

12. cis-bis (5-nitrotetrazolato) tetra amine-cobalt (III) perchlorate (or BNCP); -

13. 7-Amino-4,6-dinitrobenzofurazane-l-oxide (ADNBF) (CAS 97096-78-1); amino dinitrobenzofuroxan;

14. 5,7-diamino-4,6-dinitrobenzofurazane-l-oxide (CAS 117907-74-1), (CL-14 or diamino dinitrobenzofuroxan);

15. 2,4,6-trinitro-2,4,6-triazacyclohexanone (K-6 or Keto-RDX) (CAS 115029-35-1);

16. 2,4,6,8-tetran.itro-2,4,6,8-tetraazabicyclo

    [3,3,0]-octanone-3 (CAS 130256-72-3)

    (tetranitrosemiglycouril, K-55 or keto-bicyclic HMX);

17. 1,1,3-trinitroazetidine (TNAZ) (CAS 97645-24-4);

18. 1,4,5,8-tetranitro-1,4,5,8-tetraazadecalin (TNAD) (CAS 135877-16"=6);

19. Hexanitrohexaazaisowurtzitane (CAS 135285-90-4) (CL-20 or HNIW); and chlathrates of CL-20;

20. Trinitrophenylmethylnitramine (tetryl) (CAS 479-45-8);

21. Any explosive with a detonation velocity exceeding 8,700 m/s or a detonation pressure exceeding 34 GPa (340 kbar);

22. Other organic explosives yielding detonation pressures of 25 GPa(250 kbar) or more that will remain stable at temperatures of 523 K (250°C) or higher for periods of 5 minutes or longer;

23. Any other United Nations (UN) Class 1.1 solid propellant with a theoretical specific impulse (under standard conditions) of more than 250 s for non-metallized, or more than 270 s for aluminized compositions; and

24. Any UN Class 1.3 solid propellant with a theoretical specific impulse of more than 230 s for non-halogenised, 250 s for non-metallized and 266 s for metallized compositions.

Note: When not part of a charge or device specifically designed for civil projects in small. quantities, the energetic materials above are considered military items and are subject to UNSCR 687, para. 24.

#11. Specialized vibration test equipment

Vibration test equipment and specially designed parts and components capable of simulating flight conditions of less than 15,000 meters. a. Software specially designed for the development or production of the components or equipment above; b. Technology for the development, design or production of the components or equipment above.

#12. Specialized semiconductor manufacturing equipment

a. Items specially designed for the manufacture, assembly, packaging, test, and design of semiconductor devices, integrated circuits and assemblies with a minimum feature size of 1.0 micrometers, .including:

a.l. Equipment and materials for plasma etch, chemical vapor deposition (CVD), lithography, mask lithography, masks, and photoresists.

a.2. Equipment specially designed for ion implantation, ion-enhanced or photo-enhanced diffusion, having any of the following characteristics:

a.2.a. Beam energy (accelerating voltage) exceeding 200 keV; or

a.2.b. Optimized to operate at a beam energy (accelerating voltage) of less than 10 keV.

a.3. Surface finishing equipment for the processing of semiconductor wafers as follows:

a.3.a. Specially designed equipment for backside processing of wafers thinner than 100 micrometer and the subsequent separation thereof; or

a.3.b. Specially designed equipment for achieving a surface roughness of the active surface of a processed wafer with a two-sigma value of 2 micrometer or less, total indicator reading (TIR) ;

a.4. Equipment, other than general-purpose computers, specially designed for computer aided design (CAD) of semiconductor devices or integrated circuits; a.5. Equipment for the assembly of integrated circuits, as follows:

a.5.a. Stored program controlled die bonders having all of the following characteristics:

a.5.a.l. Specially designed for hybrid integrated circuits;

a.5.a.2. X-Y stage positioning travel exceeding 37.5 x 37.5 mm; and

a.5.a.3. Placement accuracy in the X-Y plane of finer than + 10 micrometer;

a.5.b. Stored program controlled equipment for producing multiple bonds in a single operation (e.g., beam lead bonders, chip carrier bonders, tape bonders);

a.5.c. Semi-automatic or automatic hot cap sealers, in which the cap is heated locally to a higher temperature than the body of the package, specially designed for ceramic microcircuit packages and that have a throughput equal to or more than one package per minute.

b. Software specially designed for the development or production of the components or equipment in a. above;

c. Technology for the development, design or production of the components or equipment in a. above-

#14. Certain Biological Equipment

a. Equipment for the microencapsulation of live microorganisms and toxins in the range of 1-15 micron particle size, to include interfacial polycondensors and phase separators.

Annex 2

Procedures

1. Applications for each export of commodities and products should be forwarded to the Office of the Iraq Programme (OIP) by the exporting States through permanent or observer missions, or by United Nations agencies and programmes. Each application should include technical specifications and end-user information in order for a determination to be made on whether the contract contains any item referred to in paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991) or any item on the Goods Review List (GRL). A copy of the concluded contractual arrangements should be attached to the application.

2. Each application and the concluded contractual arrangements will be reviewed by customs experts in the OIP and experts from UNMOVIC, consulting the IAEA as necessary, in order to determine whether the contract contains any item referred to in paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991) or included on the GRL. The OIP will identify an official to act as a contact point on each contract.

3. In order to verify that the conditions set out in paragraph 2 above are met, the experts may request additional information from the exporting States or Iraq. The exporting States or Iraq should provide the additional information requested within a period of 60 days. If the experts do not require any additional information within four working days, the procedure under paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 below applies.

4. If the experts determine that the exporting State or Iraq has not provided the additional information within the period set out in paragraph 3 above, the application will not proceed further until the necessary information has been provided.

5. If the UNMOVIC experts, consulting the IAEA as necessary, determine that the contract contains any item referred to in paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), the application shall be considered lapsed and returned to mission or agency which submitted it.

6. If the UNMOVIC experts, consulting the IAEA as necessary, determine that the contract contains any item referred to in the GRL, they will forward to the Committee full details of the GRL listed items, including the technical specifications of the items and the associated contract. In addition, OIP and UNMOVIC, consulting the IAEA as necessary, shall provide to the Committee an assessment of the humanitarian, economic and security implications, of the approval or denial of the GRL listed items, including the viability of the whole contract in which the GRL listed item appears and the risk of diversion of the item for military purposes. OIP shall also provide information on the possible end-use monitoring of such items. OIP will immediately inform the missions or agencies concerned. The remaining items in the contract, which are determined as not included in the GRL, will be processed according to the procedure in paragraph 7 below.

7. If the UNMOVIC experts, consulting the IAEA as necessary, determine that the contract does not contain any item referred to in paragraph 2 above, the Office of the Iraq Programme will inform immediately the Government of Iraq and the exporting State in written form. The exporter will be eligible for payment upon verification by Cotecna that the goods have arrived as contracted in Iraq.

8. If the mission or agency submitting a contract disagrees with the decision to refer the contract to the Committee, it may appeal against this decision within two business days to the Executive Director of OIP. In that event, the Executive Director of OIP, in consultation with the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, will appoint experts to reconsider the contract in accordance with the procedures set out above. Their decision, endorsed by the Executive Director and Executive Chairman, will be final and no further appeals will be permitted. The application shall not be forwarded to the Committee until the appeal period has expired without an appeal being filed.

9. Experts from OIP and UNMOVIC who review contracts should be drawn from the broadest possible geographical base.

10. The Secretariat will report to the Committee at the end of each 180-day phase on the contracts submitted and approved for export to Iraq during this period and provide to any member of the Committee at the member's request copies of applications for information purposes only.

11. Any Committee member may call for an urgent meeting of the Committee to consider revising or revoking these procedures. The Committee will keep these procedures under review and, in light of experience, will amend them as appropriate.

United Nations A/56/664–S/2001/1124

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
28 November 2001

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General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 74 (p)
General and complete disarmament: conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 28 November 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit a copy of the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia concerning the bombing of the territory of Georgia on 27 November 2001 by the military air forces of the Russian Federation (see annex).

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 74 (p), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Peter **Chkheidze**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-66589 (E) 281101

Annex to the letter dated 28 November 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia

On 27 November 2001, at 2120 p.m., six Su-25 type military jets of the Russian Federation violated Georgian airspace and bombed territory adjacent to the village of Birkani, in the Akmeta district of Georgia. The jets penetrated Georgian airspace for 50 kilometres and remained in the area for about 30 minutes. The same night, Russian military helicopters conducted several air strikes on Georgian territory near the Chechnia and Ingushetia segments of the Georgian-Russian State border, including the outskirts of the villages of Terga, Arkhti, Kue, Zemo Omalo, Akhieli and Amgha. The data on the human loss and property damage caused by these air strikes will be compiled subsequently.

Today, at 12.35 p.m., two Su-25 type military jets of the Russian Federation repeatedly violated Georgian airspace. The jets flew over Kodori gorge and retreated back to Russian airspace.

Such actions of the Russian military air forces can only be characterized as undisguised aggression against a sovereign neighbouring State.

At the same time, what is especially alarming is that the above actions were carried out on the threshold of the Summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Moscow and the planned meeting between the Presidents of Georgia and the Russian Federation. We cannot exclude that the above-mentioned actions are attempts of the destructive forces aimed against a possible positive outcome of the presidential meeting.

It is the view of the Georgian side that the above-mentioned actions became possible as a result of the disdain with which were met the numerous Georgian protests against the encroachment of Georgia's sovereignty by the Russian political leadership. The outcome of these acts conducted by the Russian side, if not suppressed in a timely manner, can only deepen the instability of the Caucasus region. One must not turn a blind eye to such threats. The international community must raise its voice against the coarse violation of internationally accepted basic principles of peaceful coexistence.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia expresses its utmost resentment and, in appealing to the Russian leadership, categorically demands the cessation of the repeated acts of aggression against Georgia.

Henceforth, if these kinds of actions continue, Georgia reserves the right to take adequate steps provided by the norms of international law.

Tbilisi, 28 November 2001

United Nations S/2001/1125

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 November 2001
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 27 November 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the official statement issued by the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation concerning the position of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on weapons of mass destruction and the measures which it has adopted in that connection, in response to issues raised by one of the States Parties during the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, which was recently held in Geneva.

I should be grateful if you would have the statement annexed hereto circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abuzed Omar **Dorda**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-66737 (E) 301101 301101

Annex to the letter dated 27 November 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya expresses its grave concern and extreme surprise at the content of the statement delivered by the United States Under-Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs on 19 November 2001 at the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction in Geneva. In that statement, he accused Libya of having an offensive biological weapons programme in the research and development stage that may be capable of producing small quantities of agent. On this occasion, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya would like to state that this unfair accusation, levelled at a time when sincere efforts are being made to wipe clean the slate of the past and to look forward to the prospect of normalizing relations between the two countries and promoting the interests of the Libyan and American peoples, has no basis in truth. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has never thought of doing such a thing and never will. Together with all peace-loving States, it is endeavouring to combat and eliminate all types of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, biological and chemical, as demonstrated in practice, both now and in the past, by its signature of and accession to all the relevant treaties and conventions, primarily the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It has also recently affirmed its commitment to the prohibition of chemical weapons, which will take effect as soon as possible upon completion of the legal and legislative procedures relating to ratification through the Basic People's Congresses.

Asserting the firm position of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on weapons of mass destruction, especially biological weapons, on the basis of its cultural policy in particular, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi pointed out the grave dangers involved in the use and possession of this category of weapons in an interview given to the Jamahiriya News Agency immediately following the spread of the anthrax germ in the United States of America, in which he said that: "This is a cowardly, demonic and irresponsible act. It poses a danger to all humanity and represents the worst form of terrorism from both the physical and psychological points of view. Biological weapons are the worst and most repugnant form of weapons of mass destruction, as they are unlimited by time and place and many affect even those who use them".

On the basis of the above, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya reaffirms that it will proceed to discharge fully its international commitments and undertakings under the conventions and treaties which it has signed or ratified or to which it has acceded. It will demonstrate to everyone the truth of what it says and the falseness of the accusations and allegations made by others. We shall firmly continue to reject terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and to combat weapons of mass destruction, particularly biological weapons, through the express convictions of the Leader of the Revolution, which leave no room for doubt and which the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has affirmed in numerous international and regional forums and conferences.

Tripoli, 25 November 2001

United Nations S/2001/1126

Security Council

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29 November 2001

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Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council the seventh quarterly report of the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), which is submitted in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999 (see annex).

01-66768 (E) 301101

Annex

Seventh quarterly report of the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission under paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999)

Introduction

1. The present report, which is the seventh[a] submitted in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), covers the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) during the period from 1 September to 30 November 2001.

Briefings and consultations by the Executive Chairman

2. In the period under review, the Executive Chairman has continued his practice of providing monthly briefings to the respective Presidents of the Security Council. He has also kept the Secretary-General and his senior staff informed of the activities of UNMOVIC. In addition, he has visited London and Vienna for consultations with Ministers of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), respectively. In New York, he has also provided briefings to visiting ministers, parliamentarians and government officials.

Staffing

3. The UNMOVIC organizational plan (S/2000/292) recognized that it might not be practical or prudent to move to full recruitment in the absence of Iraq's acceptance of resolution 1284 (1999). UNMOVIC also recognizes the need to keep the Commission lean in the sense of keeping the staffing level no higher than that necessary for the performance of its current responsibilities. A two-stage process was envisaged with the early creation of a core staff at headquarters and a roster of trained experts available to join when circumstances permit UNMOVIC to undertake the full range of tasks mandated to it, including that of inspections. That has remained a guiding principle with respect to staffing. While the paramount criteria in recruitment continues to be securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity, other considerations have been broad geographical representation and gender balance. As of the end of November 2001, the UNMOVIC core staff, in the professional grades at headquarters, is 46 persons of 24 nationalities of which 9 are women. In addition, there are 180 experts of 36 nationalities, on the roster of trained experts. Within the headquarters core staff a number of positions currently remain vacant.

4. When particular expertise is not required through in-house staff on an ongoing basis, UNMOVIC is engaging the services of short-term consultants. Such consultants assist, for example, in the preparation of revised streamlined declaration formats which Iraq is to submit, in the creation of a consolidated retrievable archival system, and a data classification system, in information technology, and in the preparation of training videos and other tasks to increase and strengthen the Commission's preparedness.

Work programme

5. Paragraph 7 of resolution 1284 (1999) calls for the preparation of a work programme for the discharge of the UNMOVIC mandate not later than 60 days after it has started work in Iraq. This programme, which is to be submitted to the Council, is to include the implementation of the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification and the key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq. While the preparation of this programme is dependent upon what is learned from essential rebaselining, already now the Commission can undertake activities that will help draft the work programme. Thus, a major effort at UNMOVIC, involving a large part of its staff and other resources, is the preparation and refinement of a draft inventory of unresolved disarmament issues. A first phase of many months of analytical work has been completed. This has involved a fresh examination of

[a] The Commission's six previous reports were issued as documents S/2000/516, S/2000/835, S/2000/1134, S/2001/177, S/2001/515 and S/2001/833.

Iraqi declarations, inspection reports and other material that the Commission took over from the former United Nations Special Commission. The second phase, which is currently under way, is to merge the issues into interrelated clusters and facilitate the assessment of the overall significance of the individual issues and obtain a better overall picture of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes, the gaps in knowledge and what remains to be verified. This work will constitute an important element in drawing up the work programme.

Non-inspection-related sources of information

6. The imagery that UNMOVIC is receiving, through a commercial satellite imagery contract, continues to be analysed, principally for infrastructure changes at sites in Iraq previously subject to monitoring. The Commission's experts are able to compare the new images with those already in the Commission's database and recently catalogued (there are some 15,000). The data are also being used to create line diagrams of sites for inspection purposes. UNMOVIC hopes that Member States will continue to provide it with imagery from their own assets as such assistance provided to date has proven very valuable. Furthermore, analysis of material from multiple sources serves to provide the Commission with a broader and independent assessment capability.

7. The analysis of open-source information continues to be another activity being pursued, particularly in the absence of on-site inspection in Iraq. Open source information may include newspapers, academic journals and other published material, as well as television and radio broadcast monitoring. UNMOVIC has now received the results of an independent study it has commissioned on open source information concerning Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities in the period following the withdrawal of the former Special Commission inspectors from Iraq. Further open source information reviews are being solicited, particularly of non-English language open source information. In the period under review, the UNMOVIC Senior Officer for Outside Information has continued to liase with Member States. UNMOVIC is grateful to supporting Governments and calls upon other Member States to provide information of relevance to the UNMOVIC mandate.

Training

8. The Commission continues to attach a high priority to the continued training of its staff and those on the roster, as part of its overall programme of readiness. In the period under review, emphasis has been placed on advanced training to enhance practical inspection skills; but a further month-long general training course for new personnel is envisaged early next year to widen the pool of available experts.

9. A second advanced training course, on biological weapons issues, took place from 12 to 22 November. Some 20 experts from among the headquarters staff of UNMOVIC and from the roster participated. UNMOVIC has also started training potential chief inspectors and team leaders from its headquarters staff. Several sessions were held in New York in September, October and November. A further advanced training course (missile issues) is planned to take place before the end of the year. The Commission stands in gratitude to those Member States that have supported its training activity.

Export/import

10. The UNMOVIC/IAEA joint unit continues to receive notifications from Member States of supplies to Iraq of dual-use items. These notifications allow UNMOVIC to produce a list of items the presence of which, or consumption, in Iraq will need to be verified. Although required to do so by the Council's decisions, the Government of Iraq has not provided its corresponding notifications.

11. Work continues on a revised handbook to assist Governments in the implementation of the export/import mechanism approved by Security Council resolution 1051 (1996), particularly following the entry into force of the new list of materials and items to which the mechanism applies (S/2001/560). A web site is also under preparation for this purpose.

Other activities

12. Work continues with the electronic scanning, classifying and archiving of material from the former Special Commission, including Iraqi documents, aerial pictures and other media. Combining the database and the archive into one searchable system is also under

way. UNMOVIC has received the results of a requirements analysis study it had commissioned on its information management needs. A detailed implementation plan is now being executed. Further information management improvements are planned, including better links with the Iraq Action Team of IAEA in Vienna. All these efforts serve to improve ways of retrieving and analysing relevant information from the Special Commission system that contains more than one million documents.

13. The UNMOVIC staff has continued to explore technologies that may be relevant to future inspection and monitoring work. With the support of a Member State, a workshop and missile test firing were held in September to evaluate potential non-intrusive missile sensor technology that may have application in connection with evaluating Iraq's missile work. The Directors of the UNMOVIC Divisions of Planning and Operations and Technical Support and Training have also recently completed a series of visits in several countries to laboratories and technology companies that may be able to assist UNMOVIC in setting up a network of laboratories for future biological and chemical monitoring work, analysis and sample determination.

Readiness

14. Inspectors and other staff in the field cannot be expected to consult numerous resolutions and other texts providing for their rights and duties and Iraq's corresponding obligations. For this reason, a draft Handbook, describing systematically the policies and technical procedures for inspectors, has been drawn up and is now largely complete. Similarly, the largely new staff at headquarters in New York also have a need of guidelines for their day-to-day work. An UNMOVIC Administrative Manual for this purpose has been completed. It will also form the basis of ground rules for administrative issues for the Commission's Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Centre (BOMVIC).

15. The Commission continues to seek to attain a high state of readiness for the start of work in Iraq. New management initiatives to this end include the preparation of checklists for operational readiness. Divisions within UNMOVIC have been tasked with preparing lists of planning and operational issues that can be addressed at this time as well as those issues that will need to be addressed as operations in Iraq commence. In addition to these checklists, quarterly divisional reports also provide the UNMOVIC Administrative Service with staffing, office accommodation and budgetary forecasts.

College of Commissioners

16. Mr. Robert Einhorn (United States of America) and Mr. Cong Guang (China) resigned from the College of Commissioners on 15 October and 26 October, respectively. By separate letters dated 26 October (S/2001/1029) and 2 November (S/2001/1064), the Secretary-General proposed to the President of the Security Council that Mr. John S. Wolf (United States of America) and Mr. Li Junhua (China) be appointed to the College. By letters dated 31 October (S/2001/1030) and 12 November (S/2001/1065) the President of the Security Council replied that the Secretary-General's letters had been brought to the attention of the members and that they had taken note of his proposals.

17. The seventh meeting of the UNMOVIC College of Commissioners was held in New York on 26 and 27 November 2001. The Executive Chairman reported on the work of UNMOVIC since the last session of the College in August. In addition, Directors of various Divisions in UNMOVIC briefed the College on the measures they had taken to prepare for operations in Iraq and on further steps they plan to take. The Chairman also confirmed that, once inspections in Iraq became possible, UNMOVIC would be ready to commence operations without delay.

18. The College welcomed the briefings and held a discussion thereon, as well as on broader issues related to international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by all States and non-State actors. Views were expressed that the events of 11 September had brought a new urgency to those efforts. It was hoped that that urgency might facilitate the efforts of the Security Council for the full implementation of the Council's resolutions on Iraq. The ongoing efforts by UNMOVIC to clarify certain terms such as "cooperation" and "unresolved disarmament issues" in resolution 1284 (1999) were felt to be helpful in that regard.

19. In accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 1284 (1999), the Commissioners were consulted on the contents of the present report.

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Security Council

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29 November 2001

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Letter dated 29 November 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I wish on behalf of my Government to report to the Security Council on measures that the Federal Republic of Germany has initiated following the armed attacks that were carried out against the United States on 11 September 2001.

As approved by the German Federal Parliament on 16 November 2001, Germany is providing nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) defence units, medical units, specialized units, air-transport capacities, naval forces, including navy aviation, and necessary support units. These measures are solely directed against the terrorist network of Bin Laden, Al-Qaida, and those harbouring and supporting it. The measures taken by Germany are not directed against the Afghan population or against Islam. Germany is taking these measures in exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

I ask that you circulate the text of the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Dr. Dieter **Kastrup**
Ambassador

01-66762 (E) 291101

United Nations S/2001/1128

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 November 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 26 November 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to my letter of 25 June 2001 to the President of the Security Council concerning my intention to establish a United Nations Office for West Africa. Following subsequent consultations, it has been determined that the Office will be referred to as the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa. It will be entrusted with the following more streamlined functions:

(a) Enhancing linkages in the work of the United Nations and other partners in the subregion, by promoting an integrated subregional approach and facilitating coordination and information exchange, with due regard to specific mandates of United Nations organizations as well as peacekeeping operations and peace-building support offices;

(b) Liaising with and assisting, as appropriate, the Economic Community of West African States and the Mano River Union, in consultation with other subregional organizations and international partners;

(c) Carrying out good offices roles and special assignments in countries of the subregion, on behalf of the Secretary-General, including in the areas of conflict prevention and peace-building efforts;

(d) Reporting to Headquarters on key developments of subregional significance.

I intend to establish the Office in Dakar. In addition to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who would be at the level of Under-Secretary-General, the Office would have seven international staff members. The duration of the Office would be for three years from January 2002, subject to a review to be conducted after its first year of operation.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

01-66835 (E) 291101

United Nations S/2001/1129

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 November 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 29 November 2001 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 26 November 2001 (S/2001/1128) concerning your intention to establish the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They welcome your intention to establish the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and take note of the functions of the office stated in your letter.

(*Signed*) Patricia **Durrant**
President of the Security Council

01-66841 (E) 291101

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Security Council

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Note by the President of the Security Council

1. Pursuant to paragraph 4 (b) of the note by the President of the Security Council dated 30 October 1998 (S/1998/1016) and following consultations among the members of the Council, the members of the Council agreed to elect the chairman and vice-chairmen of the following sanctions committee for a period running until 31 December 2001:

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone:

Chairman: Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury (Bangladesh)

Vice-Chairmen: Mali and Singapore

2. The bureau of the above-mentioned sanctions committee will be composed as above for a term ending on 31 December 2001.

01-66928 (E) 291101

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Security Council

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29 November 2001

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Letter dated 27 November 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), I have the honour to convey the attached report on the international security presence in Kosovo covering the period from 1 to 31 October 2001.

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

01-66958 (E) 301101

Annex

Monthly report to the United Nations on KFOR operations

1. Over the reporting period (1 to 31 October 2001) there were just over 42,800 troops of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in theatre. The change of command of KFOR took place on 3 October, when General Thorstein Skiaker handed over to Lieutenant General Marcel Valentin who will be in command for one year.

2. The overall situation in Kosovo during October remained relatively calm despite underlying inter-ethnic friction and harsh economic and social conditions. Acts of inter-ethnic violence and intimidation which took place included some that may have been politically motivated with the approach of the election date of 17 November.

Security

3. During the reporting period, a number of inter-ethnic incidents were reported, including stoning of people, houses and trains, vandalism and theft. On 1 October, a mine with a tripwire, found on a Kosovo Serb property near Kosovaska Kamenica, was deactivated by KFOR. On 3 October, two Kosovo Albanians were arrested for killing a Bosniac man in Vitomirica, near Pec. On 17 October, three Kosovo Albanian loggers were fired on near Radisevo near the Kosovo Serb enclave of Banja. One Kosovo Albanian was killed in this incident. Four small shops in Deneral Jankovic (near the Blace crossing point) were burned in suspected arson attacks. The passenger train between Kosovo Polje and Zvecan has been stoned, as has a Kosovo Serb convoy going to Suvi Do. Violent acts of criminal intimidation have been reported in Istok.

4. Politically motivated acts of violence included: a drive-by attack on the President of the Balli Kombtar Party on 19 October, which resulted in the deaths of his bodyguard and a journalist, and the wounding of another person; a bomb attack on the house of a Kosovo Albanian and former leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo in the predominantly Roma district of Mali Alas, on 23 October; and an attack by unknown persons with automatic weapons on the office of the Democratic League of Kosovo in Srbica, on 24 October

5. In Mitrovica, acts of violence, inter-ethnic intimidation and harassment continue to be reported, although they are for the most part minor. On 25 October, a Kosovo Albanian was assaulted by three Kosovo Serbs. On 26 October, there were two incidents, including the harassment of three Kosovo Albanian women by dissident Serb activists, and the stoning of Kosovo Serb children by a group of Kosovo Albanian teenage boys. On 28 October, young Kosovo Albanians in North Mitrovica provoked KFOR soldiers after being denied entry into a Kosovo Serb area, a person stoned a KFOR guard, and two young Kosovo Albanians were arrested by police of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) after pouring petrol on the eastern bridge and setting it alight.

6. On 1 October, a mob of 60 civilians surrounded a KFOR patrol after a vehicle was stopped for dangerous driving. The driver was detained for questioning by UNMIK police. A KFOR soldier died after being shot in the head on 24 October by a Kosovo Serb near Bozevca.

7. KFOR continues to uncover weapons, ammunition and military equipment throughout the province on a daily basis, including such items as grenades, rifles, automatic weapons, shotguns, pistols, mortars and military uniforms. A number of people have been arrested in connection with these operations. On 28 October, three ethnic Albanians with Skopje addresses were arrested for illegal possession of weapons and ammunition. In a campaign against counterfeiters, KFOR arrested a man on 18 October wanted by UNMIK police.

8. During the reporting period, 145 weapons were destroyed, bringing the total number of weapons destroyed under the weapons destruction programme to 10,132. One Allied Government has expressed interest in funding a new weapons destruction programme for KFOR.

Border/boundary security

9. KFOR continued its activities along the borders with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia[a] and with Albania to confiscate weapons, detain persons illegally crossing the borders and deter others attempting to enter the province. During the reporting period, 32 weapons, 201 grenades and mines, and 27,180 rounds of ammunition were seized. Sixty-five people were detained and handed over to UNMIK police. The number of attempted illegal border crossings continues to decrease. In anti-smuggling operations, a Kosovo Albanian was caught on the administrative boundary with Montenegro and handed over to UNMIK police.

Cooperation and compliance by the parties

10. With regard to the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), initiatives taken included a review of Directive 035 of the Commander of KFOR[b] and the issue of the Commander's Training Directive for 2002.

11. Two cases of non-compliance were reported during October. These related to misuse of position and authority, and celebratory fire. Four cases for dismissal relating to continued and unjustified absenteeism were brought forward, and four cases were closed, leaving 26 cases open. The open cases are either pending investigation or the implementation of recent directives of the Joint Security Execution Committee, or awaiting presentation to the judicial system. On 11 October, five officers of the Kosovo Police Service were detained by the Serb Army (VJ) for being inside Montenegro.

12. KPC continued to carry out a variety of humanitarian projects throughout the province, which are monitored by the International Organization for Migration. The project for the Gjiliane sports and recreational ground received extra funding. This project involves 30 KPC members working under the supervision and support of the Multinational Brigade (East).

13. Security forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia remain in general compliance with the terms of the Military Technical Agreement.

[a] Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

[b] Directive 035 emphasizes support of the KPC leadership, improvement of the relationship between KFOR and KPC, intensified training and education towards more professionalism, and promotion of a positive image of KPC.

Cooperation with international organizations

14. KFOR continues to provide daily assistance to international organizations and non-governmental organizations throughout Kosovo, on request, and to provide security assistance in support of UNMIK police operations.

Return of refugees and displaced persons

15. Only 1,600 Serbs returned to Kosovo in 2000, and only a very small number have returned in 2001. The Commander of KFOR and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General plan to facilitate the return of Kosovo Serbs through the mechanisms of the Joint Committee for the Return of Kosovo Serbs, in close cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

16. The number of refugees from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia estimated to have remained in Kosovo is 23,863.

Southern Serbia

17. The new multi-ethnic police force began patrols on 22 October in Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac, three municipalities in the Presevo Valley.

Elections on 17 November

18. Active campaigning for the Assembly elections began on 3 October. Although some unauthorized rallies have taken place, only minor incidents have been reported. KFOR, whose role is to maintain a safe and secure environment, has increased its presence on the ground.

19. The Presidential and Parliamentary endorsement by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the participation of Kosovo Serbs in the elections was given on 2 November. Over 150,000 Serbs have registered to vote. The most recent meeting of the Kosovo Transitional Council was held at the beginning of October, when it met in joint session with the Interim Administrative Council.

Outlook

20. The security situation in Kosovo continues to be stable. The main focus of KFOR is to ensure that voting on 17 November takes place in a safe and secure environment.

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 1357 (2001) of 21 June 2001, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) for a further 12 months until 21 June 2002. It details the progress of the Mission since my report of 7 June (S/2001/571) and reviews activities conducted jointly by UNMIBH and other parts of the United Nations system in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council also received a briefing by my Special Representative and Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 21 September 2001 (see S/PV.4379).

2. Jacques Paul Klein continued as my Special Representative and Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and General Vincent Coeurderoy as the Commissioner of the Mission's International Police Task Force (IPTF). The current strength of IPTF is 1,673 (see annex).

II. Activities of the Mission

3. The work of the Mission continues to be guided by the mandate implementation plan (S/2000/529, para. 34, and S/PV.4154 and Corr.1, p. 6), which is designed to create within specific timelines the fundamental administrative and personnel structures upon which a professional police force can be built. The original tasks of the plan have been refined into 66 specific projects, of which 43 have been completed and 23 are ongoing.

Police reform

4. Some 24,800 police personnel, comprising about two thirds police and one third administrative staff working in police organizations, have been entered into the UNMIBH Law Enforcement Registry. Of these, provisional authorization to exercise police powers has been granted to 15,491 police officers, comprising 6,625 in Republika Srpska, 8,229 in the Federation, 312 in Brčko District and the remainder in State institutions, such as Interpol and the State Border Service. Full certification of police officers will begin in early 2002 and is expected to be completed by late 2002.

5. UNMIBH has identified a significant number of personnel who are inappropriately serving in law enforcement positions without proper authorization. In many of these cases, law enforcement agencies have circumvented IPTF selection and registration procedures. Police officers who fail to adhere to proper policing standards can have their authorization withdrawn ("de-authorized") by UNMIBH. Between 8 October 1998 and 19 November 2001, 85 police officers were de-authorized for serious dereliction of duty, violations of the law, or for wartime conduct (56 in the Federation, 29 in Republika Srpska). However, de-authorized officers are often retained on the payroll, moved to administrative positions outside the authority of UNMIBH or given positions in public companies. Only rarely have local officials initiated disciplinary or criminal proceedings.

6. Local police, monitored by UNMIBH, now conduct the vast majority of basic training courses. The first management-training course for 120 mid-level and

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senior-level police personnel has been conducted. UNMIBH has also completed training programmes in a number of specialized areas; training in hazardous materials and anti-terrorism activities will continue throughout the mandate of UNMIBH.

7. To strengthen the ability of the police force to respond to public disorder, UNMIBH, in close consultation with SFOR, has developed a practical curriculum for joint training in riot-control for company-sized local police support units. Planning for the eight three-week training courses is under way. This project urgently requires financial assistance from donors. The estimated costs amount to approximately US$ 1.5 million.

8. In July 2001, UNMIBH established a special programme to address the trafficking of human beings, known as the Special Trafficking Operations Programme (STOP). The programme has assisted 90 victims of trafficking, principally from the Republic of Moldova, Romania and Ukraine. Civilian Police monitors assigned to the programme also monitor criminal investigations and legal proceedings following arrests with the assistance of the UNMIBH Criminal Justice Advisory Unit (see para. 16 below). Since July 2001, seven individuals have been convicted of trafficking-related offences. However, overall progress in combating this illegal trade remains severely hampered, partly as a result of weaknesses in the legal system.

9. The response of police forces to violence against minority returnees is an important indicator of police performance. Between June and November 2001, approximately 152 return-related incidents were recorded, 89 in Republika Srpska, 51 in the Federation and 12 in Brčko District. Although the majority were minor incidents involving verbal harassment, a small number represented serious acts of violence, occurring in well-known hot spots in eastern Republika Srpska. These included: the murder of a Bosniac returnee to Vlasenica, damage to Bosniac property in Bijeljina, and the use of explosives against Bosniacs in Bratunac. However, in some areas of Republika Srpska a small improvement in the willingness and ability of the local police forces to address return-related violence has been noted. In contrast to the outbreaks of serious violence in May 2001, the Republika Srpska police adequately contained demonstrations at the second Ferhadija mosque opening in June 2001. Continuing police investigations into the May 2001 violence and a murder in Vlasenica in July 2001 were generally adequate; the police officers who protected perpetrators of minority violence in Bijeljina have been dismissed and criminally prosecuted. Many severe incidents remain unresolved, however, demonstrating serious investigative lapses on the part of the police.

Police restructuring

10. UNMIBH has continued the "Police Commissioner" project (see S/2000/571, para. 16), which is an important element in its efforts to create a non-political police service, shielded from direct political interference. Ad interim police commissioners have now been appointed in the Federation Ministry of Interior, six Federation cantons and the Republika Srpska Ministry of Interior. The introduction of necessary amendments to the Laws on Internal Affairs at the cantonal level and in Republika Srpska is under way. The project, however, is facing obstruction in the mixed Croat-Bosniac canton 6 over the choice of ad interim police commissioner (Bosniac), and in the three cantons with Croat majority. The High Representative, following a written request from my Special Representative, has offered his support to overcome this obstruction.

11. To improve internal management, and enhance professionalism and accountability, following a countrywide appraisal of disciplinary mechanisms and legal procedures, UNMIBH introduced a disciplinary code. Already adopted by the State Border Service, the code will serve as a model for Republika Srpska and the Federation. To develop the modalities for intensive police force restructuring, the Mission has carried out a detailed pilot audit of one canton, to be followed by comprehensive audits of all law enforcement institutions in 2002.

12. Ensuring minority representation in local police forces continues to be one of the Mission's most difficult and labour-intensive projects. The recruitment of minority officers involves advertising vacancies, vetting prospective candidates, liaison with non-governmental organizations over housing, and supporting integration at the workplace. Since January 2000, 99 minority police officers have received housing reconstruction assistance. Currently, 179 police officers are awaiting assistance, prior to taking up their posts.

13. UNMIBH has continued its minority recruitment programmes aimed at increasing minority police representation in the local police forces. Two academies run training courses for new cadets and refresher courses for former police officers; the voluntary redeployment programme encourages serving officers to relocate. To date, 608 cadets have graduated and 329 are in training. Six refresher courses have been organized, involving 71 participants, half of whom have taken up mid-level or senior-level positions. Seven rounds of voluntary redeployment have led to the relocation of 77 minority officers, either cross-Entity or from canton to canton. A unified selection standard has been introduced at both institutions to improve the quality of new recruits. As a result of determined efforts to increase female representation, the current Federation academy class is 75 per cent female, representing a threefold increase over previous classes. Approximately 2.4 per cent of the State's registered and provisionally authorized police personnel are women (3 per cent in the Federation, 1.4 per cent in Republika Srpska).

14. As of November 2001, there were 934 provisionally authorized minority police working in the Federation out of a total of 8,229 (11.3 per cent). In Republika Srpska, 211 minority officers have been provisionally authorized from a total of 6,625 (3.2 per cent). It should be noted that the State Border Service and Brčko District police services are totally multi-ethnic, which is not reflected in the overall percentages. The recent appointment of Alija Hasic, a Bosniac, as Deputy Station Commander at the newly opened Srebrenica police station, which was initiated, designed and partly funded from the Trust Fund for the Restoration of Essential Services in Sarajevo (see para. 30 below), represents a positive step towards further minority police deployment to Srebrenica and an incentive for minority return.

Cooperation between the police and the criminal justice system

15. The Independent Judicial Commission, operating within the framework of the Office of the High Representative, continues to focus on overhauling the judiciary (judges and prosecutors). Progress has been slow, however, and even where police officers and institutions fully comply with their obligations and responsibilities, judicial misconduct has compromised prosecutions of perpetrators of ethnic violence, police misconduct and trafficking in human beings. Police officers are often discouraged from pursuing arrests and prosecutions, public confidence in the judicial system is low and widespread corruption continues.

16. The UNMIBH Criminal Justice Advisory Unit has provided direct assistance to the local police in their dealings with judicial officials. The Unit has also provided support to the STOP teams, including intervening with prosecutors and investigative judges to generate convictions from successful police actions, and has organized training courses for police officers on crime reporting. Due to imminent legal changes, these courses are now geared towards strengthening cooperation and understanding between police and prosecutors. The Unit has cooperated with other international organizations on criminal justice reform measures, in particular the Bosnia and Herzegovina State Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Codes, and the related Entity Codes.

State Border Service and inter-police force cooperation

17. The State Border Service, staffed by 1,364 personnel, is now responsible for 75 per cent of Bosnia and Herzegovina's State border, plus Sarajevo airport. Reflecting the increased engagement of the Service along the border, the number of unaccounted-for arrivals through Sarajevo has decreased from 25,000 in 2000 to less than 9,000 as at 1 November 2001. During the summer, a joint campaign conducted by UNMIBH and the Service led to a halt in the significant Air Bosna involvement in transporting illegal migrants to Tuzla. Tighter border control over a wider area has generated an increase in the seizures of contraband items. Between 1 June and 31 October, despite current mobility and communications limitations, the Service seized illegally imported goods and currency worth approximately $1 million.

18. Slow provision of donated vehicles and equipment and lack of adequate funding has delayed the deployment of field offices and mobile support units. The equipment shortfall for 2001-2002 is estimated at approximately $2.5 million; the projected shortfall in funding salaries is $16 million. The International Monetary Fund, at the request of UNMIBH, has agreed to give priority to the State Border Service in donor appeals this autumn. Funding

for equipment for the Service will be solicited at the UNMIBH bilateral donors conference in December.

19. The terrorist attacks in the United States of America on 11 September 2001 had an immediate and wide-ranging impact on domestic and regional security arrangements. The Joint Entity Task Force, created under the auspices of the UNMIBH-chaired Ministerial Consultative Meeting on Police Matters, has developed a national anti-terrorist plan of a duration of five to seven months, which includes the establishment of a database of all information gathered for dissemination among the parties and a registry of all information exchange and operational activity. The State Border Service put into effect tighter border controls at land, air and border crossings and enhanced security measures at Sarajevo airport. The Service has drafted amendments to the Law on Immigration and Asylum to further assist the anti-terrorism measures. Stressing the importance of the Service as an integral part of the fight against terror, the State Government has encouraged accelerated deployment of Service units, particularly to the country's other three airports (Banja Luka, Mostar and Tuzla).

20. To provide a State-level counterpart for the international fight against crime, encourage national information exchange and supply protection for national institutions and foreign representatives, UNMIBH facilitated the preparation of a draft law to create a State Information Protection Agency. The draft law is currently before the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency.

21. Inter-police cooperation is also pursued at the regional level. The Committee of Ministers, chaired by UNMIBH, which includes the Interior Ministers from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, the Entity Interior Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the SBS Director of the State Border Service (see S/2000/571, para. 27), approved on 12 September a regional strategy to combat illegal migration, organized crime and terrorism. The strategy includes regional information exchange to enhance the identification of suspected terrorists and affiliated organizations.

Police and public awareness

22. To break down the heritage of suspicion between the public and the police, more than 1,000 community events have been organized so far during 2001. These include "open days", school visits, demonstrations of law enforcement skills and picnics hosted by the police for children with special needs. Information campaigns to heighten public awareness of the rights and obligations of the police and citizens have continued. A major multimedia nationwide campaign, highlighting the issue of domestic violence and outlining the assistance available to the public from the police, social services and non-governmental organizations, was held earlier in the year. A national campaign to publicize and gain public support for the State Border Service was launched in August. Roadside billboards, a video spot, leaflets and a widely reported launching ceremony explained the role of the Service. The bimonthly Service newsletter "Borderline" continues to be published in local languages and in English. Since the relaunch in August of the UNMIBH web site, the number of daily hits has increased by 50 per cent, regularly reaching 2,000 and occasionally as many as 3,000.

Participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations

23. The second training course for United Nations military observers in Bosnia and Herzegovina was held at UNMIBH headquarters at the end of September. The 10-day course, attended by 21 officers from both the Federation and Republika Srpska, prepared the officers for deployment to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea in early 2002, when they will replace the current nine-person contingent from Bosnia and Herzegovina. A civilian police contingent from Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to serve with the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor. Work is in the final stages on establishing a Bosnia and Herzegovina multi-ethnic military composite unit, a light transport company with strength of approximately 130 personnel. The training programme for the unit has included the collection and transportation of vehicles and equipment, donated by the Government of Switzerland, from Berne to Sarajevo in November.

III. Joint activities of the United Nations system

24. Improved security and greater cooperation from some local officials has resulted in an increase in

minority returns. As at 30 September 2001, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had reported 56,683 minority returns, compared to 60,000 for the previous year. However, housing reconstruction remains slow. An estimated 22,401 homes are required to cover the current needs of potential returnees as well as those who have already returned. The Property Law implementation rate has slightly improved, rising to an average of 34 per cent nationwide, with 43 per cent recorded in the Federation, 24 per cent in Republika Srpska and 30 per cent in Brčko District. However, in some areas of eastern Republika Srpska, notably Foca, Sokolac and Srebrenica, and in parts of Herzegovina, less than 10 per cent of claims have been resolved.

25. The "Common country study on Bosnia and Herzegovina", an overview produced by the United Nations development agencies touching upon such issues as returns, education, health, environmental degradation and economic development, has been formally launched and is awaiting the approval of the Council of Ministers. The large-scale mine awareness campaign, carried out in cooperation with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross, has continued. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project to support the national mine clearance structure was approved by the Federal Government and has facilitated acceptance of a law on new legislative and institutional arrangements. UNDP also supported the State Government in approving annex A to the Dayton Accords, which allows access to the Global Environment Facility and provides funding for environment-related challenges and compliance with international conference obligations in environmental matters.

26. To reduce pressure on the struggling economy, the World Bank has approved new loans amounting to a total of $89.9 million, allocated for projects on poverty alleviation, community development, privatization of State-owned firms and reconstruction of electricity infrastructure. To address deeper structural problems, the Bank has published reports outlining the extent to which corruption, investment barriers and lack of creditworthiness affect the State's longer-term viability, as well as a mid-term assessment of its own programmes, which includes a detailed analysis of risks and policy recommendations.

27. Acting upon the recommendations of the theme and technical groups of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), UNICEF has now successfully implemented a rapid assessment and response project on HIV/AIDS. Through the Joint Youth Programme, UNICEF has conducted a nationwide survey among local youth on HIV/AIDS awareness, attitudes towards HIV/AIDS, and substance abuse. Further support to refugees from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has also been provided, with particular attention paid to the psychological needs of Roma children.

28. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights continues to provide useful expertise, guidance and coordination on human rights issues both to other United Nations agencies, particularly IPTF, and to governmental as well as non-governmental institutions. UNMIBH has coordinated closely with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on some important cultural projects such as restoration of the Sarajevo Haggadah and the reconstruction of the Old Orthodox Church Museum.

IV. Trust funds

29. The Trust Fund for the Police Assistance Programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina has received contributions of $14.4 million. These moneys have been used to refurbish academies, procure uniforms, vehicles and computers, and train local police and State Border Service personnel. The additional funds required for the regular police and State Border Service amount to $6.4 million. UNMIBH will host a donors conference for all police needs in Sarajevo in December 2001.

30. The Trust Fund for the Restoration of Essential Public Services in Sarajevo, established in 1994, has so far received contributions totalling $20.8 million. In addition, interest income of $3.1 million has been utilized to finance projects. From an aggregated income of $23.9 million, projects totalling approximately $23.4 million have been implemented or approved for implementation. Currently, 44 projects estimated at $4.4 million are ongoing, including 19 projects outside Sarajevo Canton. One of these projects was the conception, design, construction oversight and supply of furniture and communications equipment for the model police station in Srebrenica, which opened in

November 2001. The project was partially funded by the Government of Republika Srpska.

V. Financial aspects

31. The General Assembly, by its resolution 55/268 of 14 June 2001, appropriated an amount of $144.7 million gross for the maintenance of UNMIBH for the 12-month period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002. As at 31 October 2001, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNMIBH amounted to $107.6 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at the same date amounted to $2,611 million.

VI. Observations

32. UNMIBH continues to progress towards the goal of completing its core mandate. Significant achievements since my last report include a qualitative improvement in inter-Entity and regional police cooperation, which now focuses on anti-terrorism activities; the effective work of the State Border Service, which has reduced by two thirds suspected illegal migration to Europe; the launching of the Police Commissioner project; the success of the STOP project in tackling human trafficking; the introduction of a disciplinary code to improve internal management systems and accountability in the police force; and the intensive preparatory work to establish a State Information and Protection Agency, legislation for which is now before State bodies.

33. In the politically difficult environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina, these achievements have not come easily. UNMIBH has had to overcome strong resistance and, sometimes, defiance. UNMIBH continues to rely on the High Representative to break through obstruction, establish conducive political conditions, accelerate judicial reform and support requests for essential financial resources.

34. Of particular importance for the completion of key projects in the mandate implementation plan is the provision of $6.4 million to provide essential equipment for the State Border Service and basic equipment for the police. I appeal to Member States to contribute generously to the priority projects of UNMIBH as identified in the appeal for contributions to the Trust Fund for the Police Assistance Programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I also draw the attention of donors to the overall shortfall in funding for salaries for the full deployment of the State Border Service in 2002.

35. I welcome the opening in Srebrenica of the first model police station constructed by UNMIBH and the cooperation of the Prime Minister of Republika Srpska in appointing the first Bosniac to a senior police position at the station. I encourage more Bosniac police officers to return as an essential confidence-building measure to underpin two-way returns in the area. To these ends, UNMIBH has contributed to the improvement of the infrastructure in the area, utilizing $1.6 million released, by agreement with donors, from the Trust Fund for the Restoration of Essential Public Services in Sarajevo. However, much more needs to be done to overcome the tragic past. In order to identify the overall needs and potentials for development, an expert UNDP mission has recently conducted an initial assessment of requirements for a multi-year, area-based economic and social recovery plan, which would complement and extend the current Srebrenica action plan. The results of the assessment will be widely shared upon its completion in the coming months.

36. UNMIBH is expected to complete its core mandate by December 2002, as envisaged by its mission implementation plan. Thereafter, however, there will still be a need for continued monitoring and assistance to preserve what has been achieved. This could be carried out by a smaller police mission of approximately one quarter of the present strength of UNMIBH. Given the many commitments that the United Nations is facing, it would, in my view, be desirable for regional actors to assume responsibility for such a mission. I have instructed my Special Representative to cooperate fully with the organizations that are assessing the requirements for the follow-on police mission and may have the capacity to undertake it. An early decision on this matter would be important to ensure timely planning and a smooth transition. UNMIBH is also participating actively in current discussions on streamlining the international presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina to improve efficiency and coordination with relevant international organizations.

37. In conclusion, I would like to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Jacques Paul Klein, and the IPTF Commissioner, General Vincent Coeurderoy, for their strong leadership and to the men and women of UNMIBH for their dedication and persistence in the promotion of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Annex

Composition and strength of the International Police Task Force as at 20 November 2001

Argentina	21
Austria	35
Bangladesh	32
Bulgaria	48
Canada	9
Chile	6
China	15
Czech Republic	6
Denmark	31
Egypt	47
Fiji	13
Finland	12
France	104
Germany	163
Ghana	70
Greece	10
Hungary	13
Iceland	3
India	99
Indonesia	27
Ireland	35
Italy	23
Jordan	150
Kenya	7
Malaysia	41
Nepal	18
Netherlands	53

Norway	13
Pakistan	121
Poland	49
Portugal	41
Romania	18
Russian Federation	31
Senegal	3
Spain	33
Sweden	30
Switzerland	8
Thailand	5
Turkey	38
Ukraine	29
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	76
United States of America	87
Total	**1 673**

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Corrigendum

The last sentence of paragraph 7 should read

The estimated costs amount to approximately US$ 150,000

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Agenda item 166
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 28 November 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to draw your attention to the latest incident in the ongoing Palestinian campaign against Israel.

Last night, at approximately 7.30 p.m. (local time), Palestinian terrorists attacked several Israeli commuters with indiscriminate gunfire and grenades just north of the Gush Katif junction. Etty Fahima, age 45, was killed in the attack, and three others, including a 2-year-old girl, were wounded.

Yesterday's attack represents the latest incident in the continuing campaign of Palestinian terrorism directed against Israeli civilians. Previous attacks have been detailed in my letters dated 12 November 2001 (A/56/617-S/2001/1071), 5 November 2001 (A/56/604-S/2001/1048), 24 October 2001 (A/56/506-S/2001/1011), 19 October 2001 (A/56/492-S/2001/990), 17 October 2001 (A/56/483-S/2001/975), 8 October 2001 (A/56/450-S/2001/948), 5 October 2001 (A/56/444-S/2001/943), 3 October 2001 (A/56/438-S/2001/938), 24 September 2001 (A/56/406-S/2001/907), 20 September 2001 (A/56/386-S/2001/892), 17 September 2001 (A/56/367-S/2001/875), 7 September 2001 (A/56/346-S/2001/858), 4 September 2001 (A/56/331-S/2001/840), 30 August 2001 (A/56/325-S/2001/834), 27 August 2001 (A/56/324-S/2001/825), 13 August 2001 (A/56/294-S/2001/787), 9 August 2001 (A/56/286-S/2001/780), 8 August 2001 (A/56/280-S/2001/775), 6 August 2001 (A/56/272-S/2001/768), 27 July 2001 (A/56/225-S/2001/743), 26 July 2001 (A/56/223-S/2001/737), 17 July 2001 (A/56/201-S/2001/706), 13 July 2001 (A/56/184-S/2001/696), 3 July 2001 (A/56/138-S/2001/662), 2 July 2001 (A/56/131-S/2001/656), 21 June 2001 (A/56/119-S/2001/619), 19 June 2001 (A/56/98-S/2001/611), 18 June 2001 (A/56/97-S/2001/604), 13 June 2001 (A/56/92-S/2001/585), 11 June 2001 (A/56/91-S/2001/580), 4 June 2001 (A/56/85-S/2001/555), 30 May 2001 (A/56/81-S/2001/540), 25 May 2001 (A/56/80-S/2001/524), 18 May 2001 (A/56/78-S/2001/506), 11 May 2001 (A/56/72-S/2001/473), 9 May 2001 (A/56/69-S/2001/459), 1 May 2001 (A/55/924-S/2001/435), 23 April 2001 (A/55/910-S/2001/396), 16 April 2001 (A/55/901-

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S/2001/364), 28 March 2001 (A/55/863-S/2001/291), 27 March 2001 (A/55/860-S/2001/280), 26 March 2001 (A/55/858-S/2001/278), 19 March 2001 (A/55/842-S/2001/244), 5 March 2001 (A/55/821-S/2001/193), 2 March 2001 (A/55/819-S/2001/187), 14 February 2001 (A/55/787-S/2001/137), 13 February 2001 (A/55/781-S/2001/132), 2 February 2001 (A/55/762-S/2001/103), 25 January 2001 (A/55/748-S/2001/81), 23 January 2001 (A/55/742-S/2001/71), 28 December 2000 (A/55/719-S/2000/1252), 22 November 2000 (A/55/641-S/2000/1114), 20 November 2000 (A/55/634-S/2000/1108) and 2 November 2000 (A/55/540-S/2000/1065).

The Government of Israel holds the Palestinian Authority responsible for this attack in the light of its continuing role in orchestrating a campaign of violence and terrorism and its steadfast refusal to take concerted action against known terrorists operating in its territory. The Palestinian refusal to suppress terrorism is particularly egregious in the light of the renewed commitment of the international community to mobilize its resources to fight terrorism.

This attack also comes amidst renewed efforts to achieve a ceasefire between the sides. These efforts are destined to fail if the Palestinian leadership fails to fulfil its commitments to end terror and violence.

Israel calls upon the Palestinian leadership to take action, in accordance with its international obligations and signed agreements reached between the parties, to end the violence and terrorism emanating from the territory under its control. Israel further calls upon the international community, in the context of its global campaign against terrorism, to bring full pressure to bear on and take decisive action against all States and entities that support terrorism or are actively engaged in terrorist operations without distinction.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 166, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Yehuda Lancry**
Permanent Representative